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Abstract  
We propose a method to estimate the capitalized value of the architectural design quality of a 
neighbourhood. Our economic design premium is identified by spatially differentiating 
property prices and design quality within neighbourhoods and comparing the differences 
across neighbourhoods. We apply our method to 47 conservation area neighbourhoods in 
England in which we analyse around 7900 property transactions and interview more than 500 
residents. We find a capitalization effect of about 25.4% (£38.7k) associated with a one-step 
increase on a five-step scale ranging from not at all-distinctive to very distinctive. Our results 
suggest that this effect is at least partially driven by an architectural externality.  
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1 Introduction 
Architectural beauty can be considered a local public good – no one can be excluded from the 
utility derived from looking at an appealing building, nor does the architecture deteriorate as 
more people enjoy the view. These characteristics have straightforward implications for the 
social efficiency of private investment decisions. If there is a positive non-marketed architectur-
al externality, investments into architectural quality will be suboptimal if left to free markets. As 
with most local public goods and spatial externalities it is therefore easy to rationalize planning 
policies that correct for a market failure. In fact, various planning policies aim at preserving or 
creating public spaces of particular heritage value or architectural beauty. In England conserva-
tion is regulated under the 1953 Historic Buildings and Monuments Act, which allows for the 
listing and preservation of individual buildings, with the 1967 Civic Amenities Act and later the 
1990 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act regulating areas of architectural 
and historic interest. Many other nations have similar policies that afford protection to individ-
ual buildings or neighbourhoods that are deemed by society, and supported by law, of being 
particularly significant in their historical character or architectural appearance. In Europe these 
policies are broadly managed under the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Her-
itage of Europe (The Granada Convention, 1985). Reflecting its federalist system, historic 
preservation in the United States is enabled under the National Historic Preservation Act, with 
individual states and municipalities affording varying degrees of protection for buildings 
deemed to have heritage value. 
While the rationale for these policies to some extent rests on the assumption that an architec-
tural externality exists, there is limited quantitative evidence that substantiates this claim. Ro-
bust evidence on the economic value of architectural design, the precondition for some of the 
economic benefits that can be achieved through planning, is particularly important to justify 
such policies in light of the economic costs that have been ascribed to restrictive planning.1 The 
lack of evidence can to some extent be attributed to challenges involved in detecting effects of 
architectural design on the economic value of a location. For one thing, it is difficult to separate 
1  Restricitive planning may limit supply, create a regulatory tax, and reduce housing productivity and 
affordability (e.g. Brenner & Mühlig, 2013; Capasso et al., 2013; Cheshire & Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et 
al., 2011; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2014). Some studies suggest that the costs of planning are large compa-
red to the associated benefits (Albouy & Ehrlich, 2012; Cheshire & Sheppard, 2002). 
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the design effect from other correlated locational factors, e.g. better infrastructure, quality of 
public services, or natural amenities. For another, quantifying architectural quality is difficult. 
Metrics that would allow differentiating the design quality of different built environments are 
not readily available. We aim to advance the literature by proposing a methodology that engag-
es with both these challenges. The paper applies this methodology to an illustrative example.  
To assess the economic value of an aesthetically appealing built environment we make use of a 
two-stage double-differencing approach. In the first stage, we differentiate an economic out-
come measure as well as a design measure across spatial boundaries within a number of neigh-
bourhoods. In the second stage, the individual within-neighbourhood boundary differences are 
compared across neighbourhoods. The first stage removes features that are similar within small 
neighbourhoods, e.g. accessibility to the city centre, transport infrastructures, natural amenities 
or good schools. The second stage removes all features that differ systematically across bounda-
ries that separate different types of areas within a neighbourhood, e.g. a tax deductibility of 
maintenance costs, subsidies for renovation work or additional planning control that may be 
associated with a location in a zone of special architectural interest.  
We apply our methodology to a sample of conservation areas in England. Boundaries of conser-
vation areas are purposely drawn to protect areas that have “…special architectural or historic 
interest, the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or enhance” (Civic Amen-
ities Act, 1967 §1). English Heritage2 describes ‘special architectural’ or ‘historic interest’ broad-
ly to encourage more localized interpretations of heritage, but urges Local Planning Authorities 
(LPAs) to ensure that they are “…able to articulate the special interest and support the designa-
tion with evidence from some form of historic characterisation” (English Heritage, 2012). It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that the design character within such a designated area will dif-
fer significantly from the area just outside the conservation area. At the same time, areas at both 
sides of the boundary can be assumed to be similar in most other respects.  
As an outcome measure of economic value we concentrate on observed property prices, which 
should reflect the value buyers attach to all property characteristics, including the architectural 
                                                             
2  Also known as the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England, English Heritage is an 
executive Non-Departmental Public Body sponsored by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.  
Their role is to advise government on heritage issues in England.  
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value of a property itself and the area. With this approach we build on a long tradition of re-
search on capitalization effects of local public goods that dates back to Oates (1969) at least. Our 
spatial differencing approach to separate the design component from other determinants of 
property prices is inspired by the regression discontinuity design (RDD) literature (e.g. Basten 
& Betz, 2013; Dell, 2010; Gibbons et al., 2013; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lalive, 2008). Control-
ling for observable property characteristics and assuming that all unobserved locational attrib-
utes change smoothly in space, we exploit the sharp discontinuity in the design character of the 
built environment along a conservation area boundary to identify the capitalization effect at-
tributable to design.  
To obtain a measure of the spatial differences in design character across conservation area 
boundaries, we conduct quantitative interviews with residents living in these conservation are-
as. Among other questions we ask them to rank the distinctiveness of their area relative to 
nearby areas. The questions are asked in such a way that the responses can be aggregated to 
quantitative indices that can be matched to the spatially differentiated property prices. We also 
collect a relatively wide range of individual characteristics and use these to compute an index of 
relative design quality that is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 
Comparing the within neighbourhood differences in property prices and design quality across 
neighbourhoods, we find a causal design capitalization effect of about 25.4% (about £38.7k in 
2003 prices) associated with a one-step increase on a five-step scale ranging from ‘not at all 
distinctive’ to ‘very distinctive’. This capitalization effect reflects the benefits of occupying a 
distinctive building and a property location near to other distinctive buildings. To identify the 
capitalization effect associated with being located close to other distinctive buildings exclusive-
ly, we restrict the identifying variation to those properties that are least likely to be character-
ized by special design quality. Buildings constructed after the end of WWII and before the des-
ignation of a conservation area presumably do not possess the design characteristics that led to 
designation, even if they are located within a conservation area. Moreover, these buildings have 
not been affected by the additional planning control that comes with designation and is sup-
posed to improve the design standard. The estimated design capitalization effect remains close 
to the baseline result. We also find a design capitalization effect that is roughly within the same 
range when the comparison is based on properties located just outside conservation areas with 
and without a view onto buildings inside a conservation area. These results are suggestive of the 
presence of a design externality. The estimated design capitalization effect is large even in light 
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of a standard deviation in our preferred design index of about one third. Yet, it may be an un-
derestimate of the economic value of design quality as we exclude potential benefits to people 
living further away and visiting the areas. The important implication is that planning policies 
capable of solving the free-market coordination problem related to the architectural externality 
could potentially deliver sizable economic benefits.  
Our results are net of a policy effect, which could depreciate the value of properties due the re-
striction of owners’ property rights, and do not seem to be driven by a non-uniform implemen-
tation of preservation policies. We find that a one-step increase on our five-step distinctiveness 
score is associated with a higher annual disposable household income of £6.3k, and a higher 
share of academic degree holders of 9.1 percentage points. Controlling for income and ethnic 
differences reduces our baseline estimates by no more than four percentage points (about one 
sixth). Our results are somewhat sensitive to the wording in the design questionnaire and high-
light the importance of using formulations that seek to abstract from personal tastes and pref-
erences.  
In general terms we contribute to a literature that has assessed the amenity value of cities (e.g. 
Albouy, 2009, 2012; Blomquist et al., 1988; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2004; Gyourko & Tracy, 1991; 
Tabuchi & Yoshida, 2000) or neighbourhoods within cities (e.g. Brueckner et al., 1999; Carlino & 
Coulson, 2004; Cheshire & Sheppard, 1995; Ioannides, 2003). This literature has argued that the 
consumption value of cities has become increasingly important for the attraction of a highly 
skilled labour force and, hence, the economic success of cities (Carlino & Saiz, 2008; Glaeser et 
al., 2001). In using the economic value embedded in property prices as an outcome variable, we 
relate to a vast literature that has estimated capitalization effects of local public goods or poli-
cies (e.g. Cellini et al., 2010; Dachis et al., 2012; Dehring et al., 2008; Eriksen & Rosenthal, 2010; 
Gibbons & Machin, 2005; Oates, 1969) or housing externalities (e.g. Autor et al., in press; Rossi-
Hansberg et al., 2010; Schwartz et al., 2006). Our study specifically contributes to a literature 
that has looked into design related capitalization effects, e.g. internal or external capitalization 
effects related to proximity to iconic architecture on residential property prices (Ahlfeldt, 2013; 
Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2014; Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2009) and/or the effects of building design qual-
ity on office rents (Fuerst et al., 2011; Gat, 1998; Vandell & Lane, 1989). The closest connection 
arguably exists to research that has analysed internal and external capitalization effects of his-
toric landmark buildings (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Asabere et al., 1994; Clark & Herrin, 1997; 
Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Coulson & Leichenko, 2004; Lazrak et al., 2010; Leichenko et al., 2001; 
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Listokin et al., 1998; Noonan & Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991), and especially Koster 
et al. (2014) who provide compelling evidence of a premium associated with a view onto con-
servation areas in the Netherlands.3 Compared to the aforementioned studies, our analysis is 
unique in combining a strong control for potentially correlated location effects with intuitively 
interpretable design metrics to which the associated economic value can be mapped explicitly. 
2 Empirical strategy 
Throughout the paper we distinguish between two central effects: 1) a policy capitalisation ef-
fect, which is the effect of legal incentives (e.g. tax deductibility of maintenance cost or subsi-
dized renovation work) and restrictions (maintenance obligations and limited rights to alter the 
external appearance of a property) that often exist in zones of special architectural interest on 
the market price of a property; and 2) a design capitalization effect, which originates from the 
quality of the architecture of a building as well as the nearby buildings. We further distinguish 
three types of design capitalization effects. First, an internal effect, which is the effect of a build-
ing’s own architectural features on its price regardless of whether these are interior (e.g. wood-
en floors, carved ceilings) or exterior (e.g. shape of the structure or materiality of the facade) 
features. Second, an external view effect, which is associated with the aesthetic (dis)utility de-
rived from a direct view onto other buildings’ architecture. This effect is similar to positive ef-
fects associated with a view on mountains or the sea (Jim & Chen, 2009) or the negative effects 
of views that are obstructed by wind farms (Gibbons, 2014). Third, an external visiting effect, 
which corresponds to the capitalized benefit of living relatively close to attractive buildings so 
that the design amenity can be enjoyed when purposely or accidently passing through.4 
In this section we propose an empirical strategy that can be used to estimate the causal effect of 
the design quality of an area on the market value of properties. We propose a two-stage double-
differencing strategy, the rudiments of which we set out in more detail in Section 2.1. In the first 
stage, we spatially differentiate property prices (see Section 2.2 for details) and design indices 
                                                             
3  Our analysis is also broadly connected to some recent analyses of the political economy of design re-
lated planning (Ahlfeldt et al., 2014; Cheshire & Dericks, 2014; Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2014). 
4  Our use of the terminologies policy effect, internal effect, external effect, view effect and visiting effect 
is roughly consistent with Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010), Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos (2014), and Koster et al. 
(2014). 
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(see Section 2.3 for details) across conservation area boundaries within neighbourhoods. In the 
second stage, we compare the differentiated price and design indices across neighbourhoods 
(see Section 2.4 for details). Our strategy is primarily designed to separate the design effect 
from the policy effect, but we also offer two complementary approaches to estimate the external 
view effect specifically. We further lay out how we apply this strategy to a set of conservation 
area neighbourhoods in the Greater London region. 
2.1  Framework 
The starting point of our strategy is the assumption that in spatial equilibrium all costs and ben-
efits associated with residing in a property of a certain type and at a certain location must capi-
talize into property prices. With this assumption we build on a long tradition of research that 
dates back to Oates (1969) and Rosen (1974) at least, which has assumed that residents are 
fully mobile and there is perfect spatial competition. We believe that this assumption is particu-
larly plausible in our case as we generally identify from spatial variation at a very fine spatial 
scale. We assume that the market price (P) of a property is fully described by vectors of non-
design related structural (S) and locational (L) components, a regulatory component (R) that 
can make a property more or less attractive (taxes, height restrictions, zoning, etc.), and a de-
sign component (D). For convenience we assume a semi-log relationship, which has proven to 
suit actual data in a vast empirical hedonic house price literature.  
log(𝑃) = 𝑆𝑏 + 𝐿𝑑 + 𝛾𝑅 + 𝛿𝐷  (1) 
, where b and d are vectors of implicit prices of non-design related housing and location attrib-
utes, and 𝛾 and 𝛿 are the implicit prices of the regulatory and design components. Let’s now 
introduce a sharp discontinuity in D along a known boundary that separates a neighbourhood 
into two zones (IN and OUT) which are internally homogenous in terms of D. The price differ-
ence between two properties on both sides of the boundary is fully described by the differences 
in all non-design structural and locational attributes, regulatory features and the design compo-
nent at both sides of the boundary. 
log(𝑃𝐼𝑁) − log(𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇) = (𝑆𝐼𝑁 − 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑏 + (𝐿𝐼𝑁 − 𝐿𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑑 + 𝛾(𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇) + 𝛿(𝑅𝐼𝑁 − 𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇) (2) 
It is reasonable to make the identifying assumption that all non-design related locational attrib-
utes are the same on both sides of the boundary, i.e. 𝐿𝐼𝑁 = 𝐿𝑂𝑈𝑇, so they cancel out after spatial 
differencing. While we allow for differences in the regulatory framework across the boundary, 
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we make the assumption that across neighbourhoods the difference between the two regulatory 
frameworks in the two types of areas is constant, i.e. 𝛿(𝑅𝐼𝑁 − 𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇)  = 𝑟. Under these identify-
ing assumptions it is possible to estimate the causal effect of design quality on the market price 
of properties if variation across neighbourhoods exists in two variables: An estimate of the 
(non-design) quality adjusted spatial house price differential at the boundary of the two zones 
(log(𝑃𝐼𝑁) − log(𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇) + (𝑁𝐼𝑁 − 𝑁𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑏) and, a corresponding index of relative design quality 
(𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇). 
log(𝑃𝐼𝑁) − log(𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇) + (𝑆𝐼𝑁 − 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝛾(𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇)  (3) 
While the empirical design implied by equation (3) is, itself, straightforward, there are notable 
challenges in taking this strategy to data. First, neighbourhoods need to be identified that can be 
categorized into two types of zones which credibly vary in D across a clearly defined boundary. 
Second, there must be substantial variation in the visual character (𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇) of the two 
types of zones relative to each other across neighbourhoods. Third, the two types of zones (IN 
and OUT) in relative terms must be legally treated in the same way in all neighbourhoods. 
We argue that conservation areas in England satisfy these requirements. First, the boundaries of 
conservation areas are purposely drawn to protect coherent areas of distinctive character, 
which stand out relative the rest of the neighbourhood and under best practice scenarios are 
supported by a conservation area appraisal that provides an evidence base to substantiate the 
designation. Under §69 of the 1990 Planning (Listed Building and Conservation Areas) Act, LPAs 
are charged with periodically reviewing their territories to determine if any new areas are wor-
thy of designation based on special architectural or historic interest. It is, therefore, sensible to 
separate neighbourhoods in which conservation areas have been designated into zones that 
have been designated on the grounds of being distinctive (IN) and the rest of the neighbourhood 
(OUT), and to expect a sharp discontinuity in the appearance of the built structure at the bound-
ary of the conservation area.  
Second, conservation areas can vary greatly in architectural style. In our survey, areas ranged 
from neighbourhoods with a preponderance of Georgian and Regency properties to areas of 
Victorian and Edwardian terraces to 1930s inter-war suburban estates. It is, therefore, reasona-
ble to expect that the relative advantage in terms of the design amenity of conservation areas 
varies substantially across conservation areas. 
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Third, the legal treatment of properties in conservation areas is generally similar in England. 
Owners face heightened levels of restrictions on what they may or may not do with their prop-
erty. It is a criminal offence to totally or substantially demolish any building within a conserva-
tion area without first seeking consent from the LPA. In cases where alterations to the property 
require planning permission, owners are also required to apply for Conservation Area Consent 
and applications are determined based on the enhancement and protection of the area. Re-
strictions typically entail control over demolition and the cutting or removal of trees of a specif-
ic size. Unlike North America, properties inside conservation areas in England do not benefit 
from specific funding or tax breaks.  
2.2 Capitalization effects 
To estimate the design related house price differential across two sides of a conservation area 
boundary in a neighbourhood, we make use of a spatial variant of the regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) (e.g. Basten & Betz, 2013; Dell, 2010; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lalive, 2008). In 
estimating discontinuities in property prices at conservation area boundaries we concentrate 
on property transactions that fall within a 250m buffer inside and outside a conservation area 
boundary, an area that we refer to as neighbourhood. It is possible that properties just outside a 
conservation area benefit from a view onto properties located inside a conservation area. In our 
baseline models we exclude such properties from our sample to avoid a downward bias of the 
discontinuity estimate due to spillover effects. To define what we will refer to as the view impact 
area of a conservation area, we begin by drawing a 25m buffer around a conservation area in 
GIS. This buffer roughly corresponds to the width of half a street plus one house. While locations 
within this buffer in the neighbourhoods virtually always offer a view onto the conservation 
area as the view is just across the street, there are instances where open spaces such as parks or 
playing fields facilitate wider views. To account for such wider views, we overlay the conserva-
tion area and the 25m buffer with aerial photographs and manually adjust the buffer where 
appropriate. Figure A2 in the appendix provides an illustration of how the view impact areas 
were defined. Our baseline specification takes the following form: 
log (𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐𝛽𝑐 + 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑐𝜌𝑐 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑏𝑧 + (𝛼𝑐 × 𝜑𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡  (4) 
, where Pitc is the transaction price of a property i selling at time t in neighbourhood c. Each 
neighbourhood c contains one conservation area. We control for the typical non-design related 
characteristics in the vector Sz, where z indexes the different variables, and 𝑏𝑧 is the respective 
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively different 10 
 
vector of implicit prices. The variables considered include structural characteristics such as age, 
floor space, number of bathrooms and bedrooms, etc. as well as a relatively wide range of loca-
tion characteristics such as distance to rivers, underground stations, average school quality, etc.  
We control for arbitrary shocks that are specific to any neighborhood in any year using interac-
tions of year (𝜑𝑡) and neighborhood (𝛼𝑐) fixed effects. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑐 is a vector of neighbourhood spe-
cific running variables. Each variable in the vector denotes the distance from a property i to the 
conservation area boundary within a neighbourhood c, taking positive values outside and nega-
tive values inside the conservation area in neighbourhood c, and a value of zero outside neigh-
bourhood c. Similarly, 𝐶𝐴𝑐 is a vector of neighbourhood specific indicator variables that takes 
the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑐 < 0 and zero otherwise. We note that with DISTc we control for unob-
served locational differences within each neighbourhood that are correlated with distance to 
the conservation area boundary so that the discontinuity parameter 𝛽𝑐 = log ?̅?𝑐
𝐼𝑁 − log ?̅?𝑐
𝑂𝑈𝑇 can 
be interpreted as the premium just at the boundary (?̅?𝑐
𝐼𝑁 and ?̅?𝑐
𝑂𝑈𝑇 are the conditional mean 
prices inside and outside the conservation area). With the help of a well-known formula, the 
estimated parameter ?̂?𝑐 can be translated into a percentage effect (𝑒
?̂?𝑐 − 1) (Halvorsen & 
Palmquist, 1980) or an absolute price mark-up (𝑒?̂?𝑐 − 1)?̅?𝑐
𝑂𝑈𝑇 (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980). 
Since all control variables in Sz are demeaned (within neighbourhoods), the price mark-up for a 
property with average characteristics can be computed based on the parameter estimates from 
(4) as (𝑒?̂?𝑐 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑐, where ?̂̅?𝑐  is the mean across the year x neighbourhood fixed effects with-
in neighbourhood c.  
It is likely that DISTc not only washes out non-design locational factors, but also external visiting 
effects, which presumably decay smoothly in space. The boundary estimate from the universe of 
transactions therefore represents a composite of a policy effect – which will be differentiated 
out in the second stage of the analysis – an internal design effect and an external view effect. 
Since the view effect is interesting from a welfare economics perspective we propose two com-
plementary strategies to separate the external view from the internal design effect. 
Our first approach exploits the institutional setting of conservation areas in England. Conserva-
tion areas are designated in order to protect the special character and setting of groups of his-
torically and aesthetically relevant buildings. The conservation areas in our sample encompass 
groups of period buildings from the Edwardian, Georgian, Interwar, Regency, and Victorian pe-
riods all of which pre-date WWII. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, for the most part, 
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structures constructed after WWII do not possess the characteristic design features, which have 
led to designation of a conservation area. In fact, the reason for protecting conservation areas is 
to prevent unsympathetic (re)development, which is not in keeping with the area’s character. 
With designation, the planning authority seeks to ensure that the quality of new buildings and 
alterations of existing structures is appropriate to maintain the design quality of a conservation 
area. Since none of our zones was designated before 1967 there is a time-window of construc-
tion activity, which we can exploit to separate internal and external design effects. We make the 
identifying assumption that for buildings constructed after WWII, but before designation of a 
conservation area, there is no discontinuity in building design quality at the respective conser-
vation area boundary and, thus, no internal design capitalization effect. 
To identify the boundary discontinuity in prices of properties developed within the time-
window of interest we expand equation (4) to control for the boundary effects in prices of his-
toric properties (WWII and before) as well as properties developed after designation.  
log (𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐𝛽𝑐 + 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝜆𝑐 + (𝐶𝐴𝑖 × 𝐻𝑖𝑐)𝜙𝑐 + 𝑁𝑖𝑐𝜈𝑐 + (𝐶𝐴𝑖 × 𝑁𝑖𝑐)𝜉𝑐 + 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑐𝜌𝑐 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑏𝑧
+ (𝛼𝑐 × 𝜑𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 
(5) 
, where Hic is a vector of neighborhood c specific indicator variables denoting whether a struc-
ture i in neighborhood c is historic (WWII and before) and Nic is the same for buildings con-
structed after the conservation area in neighborhood c has been designated. 𝐶𝐴𝑖 is an indicator 
variable denoting whether a property is located in any conservation area. 𝐶𝐴𝑖 × 𝐻𝑖𝑐  and 
𝐶𝐴𝑖 × 𝑁𝑖𝑐  are vectors of interaction terms that absorb any systematic price difference between 
historic or post-designation buildings across any conservation area boundary. With this ap-
proach we impose the restriction that implicit prices of the attributes we control for (the vector 
Sz) are the same across all properties, irrespective of their construction date cohort. Compared 
to the alternative of restricting the sample to properties developed within the time-window of 
interest we save important degrees of freedom.  
Our second approach to controlling for the internal capitalization effect makes use of the ‘view 
impact areas’ introduced at the beginning of this section. We estimate a model that has a similar 
structure as equation (4). To focus on a view effect from outside a conservation area onto build-
ings inside a conservation area, we exclude transactions inside conservation areas from our 
sample and include transactions of buildings within the view impact areas. We replace the vec-
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tor of conservation area indicator variables 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐  with a vector of variables 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑐  denoting each of 
the view impact areas in each of the neighborhoods c. The distance running variables (VDISTc) 
are defined such that they take a value of zero at the margin of the view impact area.  
log (𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑐𝛽𝑐
𝑉 + 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑐𝜌𝑐
𝑉 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑏𝑧 + (𝛼𝑐 × 𝜑𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡  (6) 
We make the identifying assumption that the design quality of buildings just outside a conserva-
tion area is not systematically different between properties with and without a view onto the 
buildings inside a conservation area. Under the assumptions made, internal design capitaliza-
tion effects can be ruled out. Since there is also no policy effect, as none of the buildings ana-
lyzed is located within a conservation area, we directly obtain net estimates of the external view 
effect with this approach.  
No matter which of the discontinuity estimates one refers to, it is worth acknowledging that it is 
difficult to account for all (non-design) structural features empirically because many features 
are simply not observable. It is therefore reasonable to assume that our estimated price premi-
um ?̂?𝑐 = {?̂?𝑐 , (𝑒
?̂?𝑐 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑐 is measured with an error 𝜇𝑐  so that: 
?̂?𝑐 = [log(𝑃
𝐼𝑁) − log(𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇) + (𝑆𝐼𝑁 − 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑏]𝑐 + 𝜇𝑐   (7) 
2.3  Design indices 
Quantifying the design value of an area is obviously challenging as the quality of design is inher-
ently subjective. Moreover, suitable data, even of subjective character, is difficult to obtain. To 
compute an index of relative design quality (𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇) in the spirit of equation (3) we con-
duct interviews with residents living in conservation areas asking them how they would rank 
the distinctiveness of the area they are living in relative to nearby areas on the following scale:  
Optional answers  Numeric equivalent 
Not at all distinctive -2 
Non-distinctive -1 
Neither distinctive nor non-distinctive ±0 
Distinctive +1 
Very distinctive +2 
As listed above, we assign numeric values to each of the optional answers so that for an individ-
ual respondent n living in area c we obtain an index value 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = {−2, −1,0,1,2}. We presume that 
by asking residents about the “distinctiveness” or their area, we minimize the influence of nor-
mative judgements and personal tastes as respondents are not asked to reflect upon the subjec-
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tive beauty of their area, but rather how different it is to surrounding neighbourhoods. In part 
this measure is chosen to reflect part of the policy guidance that suggests areas should reflect 
local distinctiveness (English Heritage, 2012). To evaluate how sensitive our results are to the 
wording in the design questionnaire, we also ask a similar question where we replace distinc-
tiveness with attractiveness. In a third question we ask residents explicitly how attractive the 
buildings in the neighbourhood are to look at. Our presumption is that each of the resulting in-
dices are composites of a quasi-objective design differential (𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇) and an idiosyncratic 
component that is driven by the respondent’s tastes and attitudes, some of which are correlated 
with observable individual characteristics Fn and some of which are unobserved (𝜂𝑛). We recov-
er the design index that we are interested in from the following Mincer type fixed effects regres-
sions: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝐹𝑛𝑔 + 𝜑𝑐 + 𝜖𝑛𝑐    (8) 
, where the neighbourhood fixed effects 𝜑𝑐  form a conservation area neighbourhood specific 
design index (relative to surrounding areas) adjusted for observable individual characteristics 
Fn (g is the corresponding vector of coefficients). The vector F includes socio-demographic char-
acteristics (e.g. gender, age, education, income) as well variables that are supposed to capture 
preferences for heritage related attributes of the area (e.g. “aware of CA status” or “would con-
sider moving to another CA”). All variables are scaled to have a zero mean. Despite these rela-
tively detailed controls it is inevitable that a residual component remains unexplained. Because 
an individual n has chosen to live in conservation area c it is likely that the error term is a com-
posite of a component that is correlated with design value of a neighbourhood (𝜂𝑛𝑐 ) and anoth-
er one that is truly random (𝜗𝑛), i.e. 𝜖𝑛𝑐 = 𝜂𝑛𝑐 + 𝜗𝑛.  
The adjusted design index we recover from the first-stage regressions (7), thus, takes the fol-
lowing form: 
?̂?𝑐 = (𝐷
𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑐 +  
1
𝑁𝑐
∑ 𝜂𝑛𝑐𝑛𝑐    (9) 
, where Nc stands for the total number of responses collected in c. Because of sorting, we expect 
that interviewees living in an area are more likely to report the area as (very) distinctive than 
the representative individual so that 𝑐𝑜𝑣([(𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑐], 𝜂𝑛𝑐 ) ≥ 0. 
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2.4  Design valuation 
By substituting (7) and (9) into (3) we arrive at our second-stage estimation equation of prima-
ry interest:  
?̂?𝑐 = 𝑟 + 𝛾?̂?𝑐 + 𝜔𝑐    (10) 
, where 𝜔𝑐 = 𝜇𝑐 −
𝛾
𝑁𝑐
∑ 𝜂𝑛𝑐𝑛𝑐 .  
To the extent that the spatial differencing of property prices and design indices achieve their 
purposes, the slope parameter 𝛾 provides a causal estimate of the design effect. Under the as-
sumptions made in Section 2.1, the policy effect is captured by the constant r. Because both the 
price premium ?̂?𝑐 as well as the relative design quality index ?̂?𝑐  are generated variables we 
bootstrap standard errors in 100 replications when estimating (10) (Pagan, 1984). There are, of 
course, a number of potential candidates that can give rise to empirical concerns when estimat-
ing equation (10). 
Unobserved non-design structural characteristics, if correlated with design quality, are one ex-
ample. To alleviate this concern to some extent, our data set from the Nationwide Building Soci-
ety contains a relatively large set of structural characteristics, much larger than the data set held 
by the land registry, for example. To substantiate the identifying assumption that the differences 
in the estimated price premia across neighborhoods are indeed driven by differences in the de-
sign differential and not by systematically correlated differences in other housing features, we 
replicate our baseline model using various housing attributes (instead of prices) as outcome 
measures. In our double-differencing setting these tests corresponds to tests for discontinuities 
in alternative spatial variables that potentially determine the outcome measure but are not re-
lated to the phenomenon of interest. Such tests have become popular in the boundary disconti-
nuity literature (Gibbons, et al., 2013). 
Sorting – i.e. the spatial concentration of residents with similar preferences and income con-
straints in certain areas (e.g. Bayer et al., 2007; Bayer & McMillan, 2012; Kuminoff et al., 2013)- 
is a general concern in the hedonic house price literature. If conservation areas attract certain 
type of residents, then our boundary discontinuity estimates will partially reflect differences in 
preferences and income constraints across the boundary, and not only a design (and policy) 
effect. To the extent that such sorting into conservation areas occurs in a similar way in all 
neighbourhoods analysed, the sorting effect on property prices will be similar in all neighbour-
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hoods and, thus, absorbed by the constant in second-stage equation (10). Because the design 
value varies significantly across conservation areas this control for sorting will unlikely be per-
fect. To the extent possible we address the remaining concern in robustness checks. We control 
for various socio-economic characteristics such as income, education, and ethnicity in the first-
stage property price RDD models (equation 5-7). Alternatively, we control for differences in 
these neighbourhood characteristics across boundaries in the second-stage model (equation 
10). A limitation of this approach is that even the most spatially disaggregated data from official 
neighbourhood statistics refer to statistical units (e.g. output areas), whose boundaries are not 
congruent with conservation area boundaries. A closer inspection reveals that the spatial statis-
tical units are at least small enough to allow for a meaningful representation of income or edu-
cational differences across conservation area boundaries (see Section 2.3 in the appendix for 
details). Referring to the error structure in equation (10) we note that given the presumed posi-
tive correlation between unobserved design specific preferences and the design index 
(𝑐𝑜𝑣([(𝐷𝐼𝑁 − 𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇)𝑐], 𝜂𝑛𝑐 ) ≥ 0) there is a sorting-related downward pressure on the estimat-
ed design effect. Essentially, sorting increases the variance of our design quality index (the in-
dependent variable), which potentially mitigates the effect of the sorting-related increase in 
variance in the price premium (the dependent variable). 
A related concern that is specific to our setup is that sorting of households with specific prefer-
ences into certain conservation areas could create a mechanical link between the price premium 
in an area and the reported design score. The effect would be similar to an omitted variable that 
impacts on the price premium as well as on the reported (relative) design quality simultaneous-
ly. According to the model of the political economy of conservation areas by Ahlfeldt at al. 
(2014), a rational planner will begin by designating areas of the highest design quality as desig-
nation offers the highest social returns. Assuming that such a relationship between design value 
and designation date holds, we make use of the latter as an instrumental variable for our design 
indices to remove a potential mechanical link. As an additional instrumental variable we use the 
density of listed buildings within a conservation area. We also note that our test of external view 
effects using properties with and without a view located outside conservation areas and re-
sponses by interviewees living inside conservation areas is not affected by this problem. 
So far, we have assumed that the differences in regulation of areas inside and outside conserva-
tion areas are similar in all neighbourhoods. This is generally a reasonable assumption, but 
there is an exception. Where councils are concerned that slow incremental change is damaging 
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the character of the area they can also remove householders’ General Permitted Development 
Rights via an Article 4 Direction that then further restricts alterations to property. It is possible 
that such extra control is more likely to be imposed in areas with a higher design value. If 
stronger planning controls led to a larger (negative) policy effect, we would underestimate the 
(positive) design effect. Since we observe the Article 4 status of a conservation area, we are able 
to control for the associated capitalization effects. A less obvious concern is that some LPAs 
could theoretically be relatively more restrictive within conservation areas than outside con-
servation areas and that this relative restrictiveness could be correlated with the average design 
quality of conservation areas relative to nearby areas within these LPAs. We are able to address 
arbitrary differences in the regulatory environment across LPAs by means of LPA fixed effect, 
but need to be careful with the interpretation in light of limited degrees of freedom (21 LPAs for 
47 neighbourhoods). 
3 Data and institutional setting 
3.1  Sampled conservation areas 
In England, the designation of conservation areas started in 1967 and continues today under 
provisions 69 and 70 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. They 
receive further support from the new National Planning Policy Framework (2012) where they 
are described as heritage assets. As of 2011 there were some 9,800 conservation areas in Eng-
land, which are identified as having “special architectural or historic interest, the character or 
appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance” (Section 69). As they are typically 
locally defined, they can vary greatly from place to place, but most often encompass street pat-
terns, open spaces or groups of buildings that contribute to a sense of place and are therefore 
deemed as worthy of enhancement and protection. Our sampling strategy was to include con-
servation areas with varying levels of deprivation as described by 2007 ward level deprivation 
indices and conservation areas located in both inner and outer London boroughs. We selected 
24 areas with relatively high levels of deprivation and 24 with low levels, and 27 conservation 
areas within inner London boroughs and 21 located in outer London. One of the sampled con-
servation areas (Courtfield) could not be considered in the analysis due to insufficient property 
transactions. The exact locations of the surveyed conservation areas are shown in Figure A1 in 
the appendix. Given the very localised notion of heritage, it is no wonder that our 47 conserva-
tion areas also varied in style from the more common Victorian housing developments, to Re-
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gency, Georgian, Edwardian and Inter-war estates. Many of the areas, like St Marks (Hackney) 
and Bowes Park (Haringey), were the result of speculative development whilst others like Bren-
tham Gardens (Ealing), the Cuckoo Estate (Ealing), and Clyde Circus (Haringey) were formally 
planned. Properties in these conservation areas range from bungalows and low-density devel-
opment in places like the Mayfield (Redbridge) to more dense terraced housing (North Kilburn, 
Brent), to substantial villas St (Matthias, Richmond) to Regency terraces (Oakhill, Kingston). All 
of the areas reflect a combination of distinctive public or private buildings (e.g. churches, librar-
ies or shopping arcades), open spaces, trees or street patterns, which set them apart from sur-
rounding neighbourhoods. 
3.2 Property data 
For the estimation of property price premia at conservation area boundaries we use transac-
tions data related to mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 
1995 and 2010. For our selected conservation area neighbourhoods, the data for England com-
prise around 7,900 observations and include the price paid for individual housing units along 
with detailed property characteristics.5 These characteristics include floor space (m²), the type 
of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There 
is also some buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold). Im-
portantly, the data set is geo-referenced (within the British National Grid coordinate system) so 
that it is possible to merge the transaction data to locational attributes in GIS (Geographic In-
formation System).  
Merging this information with an electronic map of 8,167 conservation areas in England, it was 
possible to calculate distances to conservation area borders and to determine whether the 
property lies inside or outside of these borders in any of the considered neighbourhoods. We 
further compute distances to the nearest Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, Natural Nature 
Reserve, lake, river, coastline, bus stop, railway track, London Underground station as well as 
the average key stage 2 score weighted by distance the respective schools. A detailed descrip-
tion of the construction and the sources of these locational and neighbourhood variables is pro-
                                                             
5  For England as a whole Nationwide data set contains 1,088,446 transactions, approximately 10% of all 
transactions. 
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vided in the appendix to Ahlfeldt et al (2014). As neighbourhood characteristics we consider the 
2005 median income (from Experian) as well as the share of population holding an academic 
degree, shares of various ethnic groups and a Herifindahl index of ethnic segregation (all from 
the 2001 census).  
3.3  Residential survey 
In total, we surveyed 526 residents in the sampled conservation areas. Surveys were conducted 
face-to-face and the sample was drawn such that homeowners and both private and social 
renters were included. There were 53 questions in the survey covering topics ranging from de-
mographics, level of community involvement, attitudes toward the area in terms of likes and 
dislikes, attitudes toward the planning system, experiences with planning applications, experi-
ences with objecting to applications, etc. Questions were both multiple choice and discursive 
allowing for longer responses to gauge more fully resident’s opinions about living in their 
neighbourhood and about planning regulation. The quantitative data from these interviews was 
input into Stata and analysed. 
4 Results 
4.1  Capitalization effects 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the estimated relative (?̂?𝑐) and absolute ((𝑒
?̂?𝑐 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑐) 
price premia across all conservation areas. We report the distribution of point estimates de-
rived from three different first-stage property price RDD models. First, the baseline model (4), 
which provides estimates of the composite policy, internal design as well as external view ef-
fects (black lines). Second, model (5), which identifies the effects from non-historic properties 
constructed before designation and, thus, includes the policy effect and the external view effect 
(dark red lines). Our third model (6) compares properties with and without a view outside con-
servation areas and, thus, provides a pure estimate of the external view effect (red lines). We 
lose two conservation areas in the second model and one conservation area in the third model 
due to insufficient of degree of freedoms.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, property prices generally tend to be higher in conservation areas. This 
is also true for the baseline model, implying that, on average, the negative policy effect does not 
exceed the positive design effect. In fact, the average premium is larger than in the two other 
models, suggesting that the internal design effect alone is larger than the policy effect. On aver-
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age, properties just inside a conservation area boundary are about 9.0% (£13,520) more expen-
sive than properties just outside. Controlling for boundary effects on historic and post-
designation buildings the mean premium is reduced to about 4.5% (£7,390). The mean premi-
um for properties just outside conservation areas with a view onto buildings in a conservation 
area with 4.6% (£6803) is within the same range.  
More importantly for the cross-conservation area comparison is the degree of variation. The 
estimated premia in the baseline model vary as much as from -30.3% to +66.6% or -£84,775 to 
+£87,367. Standard deviations with 19.8% or £33,383 are relatively high. Standard deviations 
in the estimates excluding the internal effect are even larger (25%-29%). 13 out of 47 conserva-
tion areas achieve a negative premium (baseline model). There is, thus, significant variation to 
be attributed to differences in design. A full list of RDD estimates (baseline model) by conserva-
tion area is provided in Table A1 in the appendix. The estimated hedonic implicit attribute pric-
es of the various property characteristics we control for are presented in Table A2 in the appen-
dix. They generally offer little surprise. 
In Figure 2 we compare our baseline estimate of the price premia at the boundaries to the esti-
mates, which control for the internal design capitalization effect. Reassuringly, we find a close 
correlation.  
Fig. 1. Distribution of relative and absolute conservation area premiums 
 
Notes: Black (dark red) [red] lines show the distribution of baseline equation (4) RDD estimates (equation (5) 
RDD estimates controlling for effects on historic and post designation properties) [equation (6) estimates 
focussing on view effects outside conservation areas]. Dashed lines represent the means of the distribu-
tions. 
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Fig. 2. RDD estimates: Baseline vs. controlling for internal effect 
 
Notes:  Green (red) squares (triangles) compare baseline equation (4) RDD estimates to equation (5) RDD esti-
mates controlling for boundary effects on historic and post-designation properties [equation (6) esti-
mates focussing on view effects outside conservation areas]. Green dashed (red dotted) line are the linear 
fits. 
4.2  Design indices 
In Table 1 we examine how the reported design scores correlate with individual characteristics 
of the respondents and some observable design related characteristics of the areas they live in. 
Relative to the Victorian character, which is the most frequent style and forms our base catego-
ry, Georgian and Interwar styles are more likely to be reported as attractive. Also, planned es-
tates carry a premium in the reported attractiveness scores (1). This pattern is also apparent 
when we ask an alternative question explicitly about the attractiveness of the buildings (5) in 
the area. Georgian style areas are also more likely to be reported as distinctive (3). It is im-
portant to note, however, that most non-Victorian styles apply to no more than a couple of con-
servation areas, so some care is warranted with the interpretation. In columns (2), (4) and (6) 
we replace the conservation area characteristics with conservation area fixed effects. These 
models provide a strong control for unobserved conservation area characteristics and, thus, 
more credible estimates of the effects of individual characteristics. Only few individual charac-
teristics turn out to exhibit significant partial correlations with the design scores. Women and 
degree holders tend to rank their area somewhat lower in terms of attractiveness. Individuals 
with higher incomes or those who are in full-time employment tend to rank their areas some-
what lower in terms of distinctiveness. Individuals who reported to be likely to move to another 
conservation area were more likely to rank their area as attractive while individuals who were 
aware of the conservation area status of their areas were more likely to report it as distinctive.  
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Tab. 1. Design score regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas 
Distinctiveness relative 
to surrounding areas 
Attractiveness  
of buildings 
Female (dummy) -0.124** 
(0.059) 
-0.171** 
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.067) 
0.021 
(0.075) 
-0.034 
(0.080) 
-0.029 
(0.080) 
Age (years) -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
British (dummy) 0.041 
(0.106) 
0.003 
(0.108) 
0.143 
(0.104) 
0.126 
(0.113) 
0.074 
(0.109) 
0.026 
(0.091) 
White (dummy) 0.083 
(0.110) 
-0.028 
(0.109) 
-0.031 
(0.098) 
-0.140 
(0.113) 
0.033 
(0.102) 
-0.114 
(0.098) 
In full-time em-
ployment (dummy) 
-0.195** 
(0.089) 
-0.101 
(0.096) 
-0.284*** 
(0.104) 
-0.186* 
(0.101) 
-0.103 
(0.079) 
-0.045 
(0.070) 
Income (£/year) 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
University degree 
(dummy) 
-0.170* 
(0.098) 
-0.178* 
(0.104) 
-0.049 
(0.135) 
-0.059 
(0.133) 
0.010 
(0.125) 
-0.028 
(0.104) 
Homeowner (dum-
my) 
0.045 
(0.135) 
0.076 
(0.143) 
0.008 
(0.124) 
0.115 
(0.135) 
0.033 
(0.130) 
0.106 
(0.115) 
Years stayed at 
property 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Aware of CA status 
(dummy) 
0.183* 
(0.096) 
0.029 
(0.096) 
0.346*** 
(0.124) 
0.237* 
(0.139) 
0.225** 
(0.104) 
0.115 
(0.094) 
Would consider 
moving to a CA 
0.210*** 
(0.071) 
0.195** 
(0.080) 
0.164** 
(0.076) 
0.134 
(0.086) 
0.115* 
(0.068) 
0.111 
(0.072) 
Georgian 0.239** 
(0.110) 
 
 
0.496*** 
(0.091) 
 
 
0.367*** 
(0.115) 
 
 
Regency 0.006 
(0.157) 
 
 
0.113 
(0.156) 
 
 
0.111 
(0.215) 
 
 
Edwardian 0.028 
(0.116) 
 
 
0.020 
(0.132) 
 
 
-0.124 
(0.110) 
 
 
Interwar 0.381*** 
(0.100) 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.149) 
 
 
0.325** 
(0.129) 
 
 
Planned 0.262** 
(0.098) 
 
 
0.133 
(0.105) 
 
 
0.242* 
(0.133) 
 
 
Constant 0.761*** 
(0.091) 
0.874*** 
(0.042) 
0.758*** 
(0.090) 
0.870*** 
(0.039) 
1.009*** 
(0.122) 
1.114*** 
(0.039) 
Conservation area 
fixed effects 
NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 524 524 524 524 521 521 
R2 0.087 0.231 0.097 0.212 0.084 0.319 
Notes:  Baseline architectural style category is Victorian. All individual variables are demeaned. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered on conservation areas. A hand full of missing values in age, income and de-
gree have been set to zero and denoted by 0,1 indicator variables. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The fixed effects estimated in models (2), (4) and (6) are recovered and used as conservation 
area design indices in the remainder of the analysis (see specification 9 and corresponding dis-
cussion for details).  
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the reported relative design scores across to conservation are-
as (left) as well as the distribution of individual deviations from the area means (right). The 
between distributions of design scores peak close to one, which implies that on average the 
sampled conservation areas were considered as distinctive and attractive compared to nearby 
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areas. Only 5% of conservation areas received negative mean design scores and, thus, lean to-
wards being not distinctive or being not attractive. There are quite a few areas that are at the 
margin of being distinctive or attractive or at the margin of being very distinctive or very attrac-
tive. Within conservation areas the distribution of individual scores is clearly concentrated 
around the mean score of the area. About 52.6% (50%) of the answers are within a ±0.5 range 
of the mean conservation area distinctiveness (attractiveness) score. Only about 18.6% (15%) 
of the individual scores are outside a ±1 windows. There seems to be some consensus on the 
design value of the area.  
In Figure 4 we make an attempt to externally validate the design scores. As expected, conserva-
tion areas characterised by higher design quality were designated earlier. Our preferred and, 
presumably, more objective design measure distinctiveness shows a stronger correlation with 
the designation date, suggesting that it better captures design elements that were considered 
during the designation process. More generally, Figure 4 suggests that our design indices indeed 
capture the phenomenon of interest and that the designation date might serve as a predictor of 
design quality. 
Fig. 3. Within and between neighbourhood distribution of design scores 
 
Notes:  Black (red) lines show the distribution of attractiveness (distinctiveness) scores. Dashed lines show the 
means of the distributions. Dotted lines (left) show the between-neighbourhood distribution after adjust-
ing for observable interviewee characteristics. 
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Fig. 4. Design quality vs. year of designation 
 
Notes:  Green (red) [blue] squares (triangles) [circles] compare the adjusted relative distinctiveness scores (rela-
tive attractiveness) [how attractive buildings are to look at scores] to the year of designation of a conser-
vation area. 
4.3  Design valuation: Descriptive evidence 
At the heart of our empirical strategy is the comparison of an objective price premium derived 
from actual market transactions and a reported measure of relative design value collected in 
quantitative surveys. To cross-validate the interview-based collection process, we compute an 
index of “expensiveness” based on a question that was otherwise phrased exactly as those in-
quiring about the design features of primary interest. As shown in Figure 5 we find a positive 
correlation between the reported expensiveness scores and our estimated price premia. Not 
surprisingly, home owners seem to be particularly aware of the price premium (or discount) 
their area achieves. The correlation is stronger when structural differences are conditioned out 
in the first-stage RDD, which indicates that these seem to be accounted for to some extent by the 
respondents.  
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Fig. 5. Estimated and reported conservation area premium 
 
Notes:  Green (red) squares (triangles) indicate the responses by owners (renters). The size of the markers is 
proportionate to the number of responses in a conservation area. Dashed (dotted) lines are weighted (by 
number of responses) linear fits for owners (renters). Unconditional estimates exclude property charac-
teristics and distance trends. Conditional estimates are the baseline results. 
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between our estimated price premia and the design indices 
summarized in equation (10). We compare the relative (?̂?𝑐) and absolute ((𝑒
?̂?𝑐 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑐) 
property price premia estimated according to our baseline specification (specification 4, green 
squares) as well as when controlling for internal effects (specification 5, red triangles) to the 
(adjusted) relative distinctiveness and attractiveness scores of the areas. There is a generally 
positive and well defined relationship between property price premium and the design score in 
all four panels. Outliers are labelled in all panels if they are more than 1.5 standard deviations 
from the weighted (by number of respondents) linear prediction. The correlation between the 
estimated price premia is generally stronger with the distinctiveness score than with the attrac-
tiveness score, which confirms our notion that the former is our preferred design measure be-
cause it is, likely, less subjective. Overall, the patterns revealed by Figure 6 are suggestive of a 
relatively strong and positive link between the design value of an area and a property price 
premium achieved. 
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Fig. 6. Conservation area premium vs. design index 
Distinctiveness Attractiveness 
Relative premium 
  
Absolute premium 
  
Notes:  Green (red) squares (triangles) compare baseline RDD estimates (RDD estimates controlling for boundary 
effects on historic and post-designation buildings) to relative design indices. The size of the markers is 
proportionate to the number of responses in a conservation area. Dashed (dotted) line is the weighted 
linear fit. 
4.4  Design valuation: Baseline econometric analysis 
In Table 1 we present econometric estimates of the relationship between the estimated price 
premium (conditional boundary discontinuities according to equation 4) and the relative dis-
tinctiveness index (adjusted for interviewee characteristics) by conservation area. We begin 
with the baseline model excluding distance trends in the first-stage property price RDD models 
in column 1. In column 2 we use the estimated premium from the baseline model (in log points), 
which includes distance trends in the first-stage. In column 3 we use the same price premium 
estimates, but expressed in terms of absolute premia (in £). In columns 4 and 6 we attach higher 
weights to areas where the design scores are based on a larger number of individual design 
scores. In columns 5 and 6 we add some controls describing the architectural style of an area 
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(dummy variables, Victorian being baseline), whether the area was developed as a planned es-
tate, or whether there is additional planning control through an Article 4 Directive.  
We find a positive and precisely estimated impact of distinctiveness on property prices, which is 
very consistent across specifications. Our baseline estimate in column 2 implies that a one-step 
increase on our five-step scale from not at all distinctive (-2) to very distinctive (+2) is associat-
ed with an about 25.4% (exp(0.23) − 1) property price premium. The corresponding absolute 
premium amounts to about £38.6k (column 3). A one standard deviation increase in relative 
distinctiveness (0.387) implies an increase in property value of 9.8% (£14.9k). Our estimates 
are not particularly sensitive to excluding the distance trend in the first-stage property price 
RDD estimates, which indicates that unobserved location characteristics are of limited concern. 
A comparison between column 1 and 2 results does also not indicate the existence of strong 
visiting effects as these presumably are absorbed by the distance trends in the RDD estimates in 
(2). Minimally, the positive visiting effect is smaller than the negative effect of other unobserved 
variables that are correlated with distance to the boundary. Finally, the robustness to the added 
control variables (in 5 and 6) seems to suggest that the design effect is not driven by particular 
architectural styles or special planning control through Article 4. 
Table 3 replicates Table 2 replacing the distinctiveness with the attractiveness score. In line 
with Figure 6 the attractiveness effect is qualitatively similar, but slightly smaller. A one-step 
increase on our five-step scale from not at all attractive (-2) to very attractive (+2) is associated 
with an about 23.6% (exp(0.212) − 1) property price premium. The corresponding absolute 
premium amounts to about £35.8k (column 3). A one standard deviation increase in relative 
attractiveness (0.41) implies an increase in property value by 9.7% (£13k). As in Table 2, ex-
cluding the distance trends from the price premium RDD model leads to a lower design premi-
um, which is not suggestive of a strong visiting effect. Compared to the distinctiveness effects, 
the attractiveness effects are more sensitive to the controls added in models 5 and 6. If the dis-
tinctiveness and attractiveness effects are estimated conditional to each other, both effects are 
generally reduced. The two effects seem difficult to separate empirically, which is not surprising 
given that they capture different shades of a similar phenomenon. Overall, however, the distinc-
tiveness effect tends to stay somewhat closer to the baseline results. This is in line with the logic 
behind designation, which has at its heart the protection and enhancement of distinctive areas 
(English Heritage, 2011). Full estimate results are in Table A3 in the appendix.  
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively different 27 
 
Tab. 2. Distinctiveness effects (internal and external view) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Price premium in conservation area relative to surrounding areas 
 log points log points £ log points log points log points 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.219*** 
(0.062) 
0.226*** 
(0.043) 
38673.767*** 
(9241.742) 
0.235*** 
(0.060) 
0.209*** 
(0.059) 
0.221*** 
(0.073) 
Constant -0.081 
(0.050) 
-0.103** 
(0.042) 
-18908.555** 
(8530.462) 
-0.120** 
(0.054) 
-0.133** 
(0.055) 
-0.145** 
(0.062) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2nd stage controls - - - - Yes Yes 
WLS - - - Yes - Yes 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 
r2 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.35 0.34 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that 
price premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1 st-stage distance 
trends indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area boundary 
trends. 2nd stage controls consist of the following variables: Dummy variables for the architectural styles 
Georgian, Regency, Edwardian, Interwar (baseline architectural style category is Victorian), dummy vari-
able for planned estate, dummy variable for Article 4. WLS estimates are weighted by the number of sur-
vey responses in an area. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Tab. 3. Attractiveness (internal and external view) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Price premium in conservation area relative to surrounding areas 
 log points log points £ log points log points log points 
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.160** 
(0.065) 
0.212*** 
(0.052) 
35783.0*** 
(9892.9) 
0.192*** 
(0.066) 
0.115 
(0.078) 
0.119* 
(0.068) 
Constant -0.038 
(0.060) 
-0.101** 
(0.045) 
-18166.48* 
(9642.2) 
-0.088 
(0.060) 
-0.069 
(0.111) 
-0.136* 
(0.077) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2nd stage controls - - - - Yes Yes 
WLS - - - Yes - Yes 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 
r2 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.79 0.81 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that 
price premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1 st-stage distance 
trends indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area boundary 
trends. 2nd stage controls consist of the following variables: Dummy variables for the architectural styles 
Georgian, Regency, Edwardian, Interwar (baseline architectural style category is Victorian), dummy vari-
able for planned estate, dummy variable for Article 4. WLS estimates are weighted by the number of sur-
vey responses in an area. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.5 Design valuation: External view effects 
From a welfare economics perspective it is primarily the architectural externality, which is of 
interest when it comes to the economic value of building design quality. Having separated the 
design effect from the policy effect we now attempt to estimate the external view effect specifi-
cally. In Table 4 we estimate design capitalization effects using the price premia estimated ac-
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cording to the extended RDD specification (5). Because we identify these price premia from a 
smaller subset of property transactions we lose some conservation areas due to limited degrees 
of freedom. We consider price premia that stem from the full specification (columns 3 and 6), 
but also experiment with controlling for effects on historic properties (WWII and before), but 
not for properties developed after designation (columns 1-2 and 4-5) as well as excluding dis-
tance trends (columns 1 and 4) in the first-stage price premium RDD. We combine these 
measures with our distinctiveness (columns 1-3) and attractiveness (columns 4-6) scores.  
Our preferred model in column 3 implies a 24.1% increase in property value associated with a 
one-step increase on the distinctiveness score (9.9% per standard deviation), which is remark-
ably close to the baseline model (Table 2, column 2). Including variation from properties 
(re)developed after a conservation area has been designated, counter to our expectations, de-
creases the design effect, but the effect stays within the same range (columns 1 and 2).  
We obtain very different results when replacing the distinctiveness score with the attractive-
ness score (column 4-6). We find no significant correlation between the price premia and the 
attractiveness score, which further adds to the notion that reported attractiveness seems to be 
an imperfect proxy of the market perception of the value of design quality.  
In Table 5 we focus on the view impact areas outside conservation areas. The price premia used 
as dependent variables are based on a comparison between properties located outside conser-
vation areas with and without a direct view onto buildings inside conservation areas (equation 
6). We experiment with including (columns 4-6) and excluding (columns 1-3) distance trends in 
the first stage when computing the price premia. Because prices are not differentiated across 
the conservation area boundary, but across boundaries of view impact areas outside conserva-
tion areas, it seems useful to use an absolute measure of the design value of buildings inside the 
conservation areas (columns 3 and 6). We note that an attractive feature of this setup is that the 
design score is based on the preferences stated by people living inside conservation areas while 
the property price premia are based exclusively on the valuation by buyers who have purchased 
properties outside conservation areas.  
We find evidence for a positive external view effect in the preferred models that control for dis-
tance trends in property prices (4-6). Excluding distance trends results in significantly smaller 
design effects which, once more, is not in line with the presence of a sizable external visiting 
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effect. The combination of our preferred measures of price premium (conditional on distance 
trend) and design quality (distinctiveness) in column 5 yields a design effect that is within the 
range of the distinctiveness effects in Table 4 (1-3) and the baseline model (Table 2, column 2). 
This is a notable and reassuring result given that the price premia are identified from a different 
set of properties. Moreover, this consistency suggests that the design effect in the baseline mod-
el (Table 2, column 2) is to a significant extent attributable to an architectural externality. 
Tab. 4. Effects on properties developed after WWII and before designation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Price premium in conservation area relative to surrounding areas  
(log points) 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.160** 
(0.064) 
0.175** 
(0.076) 
0.216** 
(0.090) 
   
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
   -0.001 
(0.095) 
0.036 
(0.094) 
0.077 
(0.101) 
Constant -0.075 
(0.063) 
-0.109 
(0.076) 
-0.135 
(0.090) 
0.059 
(0.081) 
0.005 
(0.080) 
-0.024 
(0.084) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st. stage dist. trend effects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
1st. stage historic effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st. stage post-des. effects - - Yes - - Yes 
N 45  45  44  45  45  44  
r2 0.081 0.086 0.106 0.000 0.004 0.015 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that 
price premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1 st-stage distance 
trends indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area boundary 
trends. 1st. stage historic effects (1st. stage post-des. effects ) indicates that price premium is estimated 
conditional on boundary effects on historic (post-designation) properties. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 
0.01. 
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Tab. 5. Effects on outside properties with a view on conservation areas  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Price premium in view impact area relative to surrounding areas  
(log points) 
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.081 
(0.054) 
 
 
 
 
0.175*** 
(0.063) 
 
 
 
 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
 
 
0.095 
(0.074) 
 
 
 
 
0.179* 
(0.094) 
 
 
Buildings are attractive to 
look at (-2 to 2) 
 
 
 
 
0.076 
(0.048) 
 
 
 
 
0.124*** 
(0.039) 
Constant -0.065 
(0.054) 
-0.071 
(0.055) 
-0.077 
(0.052) 
-0.109** 
(0.053) 
-0.102 
(0.066) 
-0.090** 
(0.044) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends    Yes Yes Yes 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
r2 0.052 0.061 0.061 0.106 0.096 0.071 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates 
that design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that 
price premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1st-stage distance 
trends indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to placebo view impact area 
boundary trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
4.6 Design valuation: Robustness 
We have run a number of additional robustness tests, which we summarize in this section. The 
results generally substantiate the interpretation and conclusions presented so far. Estimation 
results are reported in appendix Tables A4-A9 in the appendix.  
We begin by showing correlations between estimated boundary effects in various property 
characteristics and relative design quality scores across conservation areas in Figure 7. Para-
metric estimates are presented in Table A4 in the appendix. We find no significant correlation 
when instead of the log of sales price we consider the log of floor space, the log of the number of 
bedrooms, the log of the age of the structure, whether a property has a garage or central heating 
or whether the property is held in leasehold as a dependent variable in our first-stage RDD 
(equation 4). These complementary results make it arguably less likely that our estimated de-
sign capitalization effects are driven by internal property characteristics that are correlated 
with design value.  
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Fig. 7. Boundary effects in covariates vs. relative design quality 
 
Notes:  Y-axis shows first-stage RDD estimates according to the baseline equation (4) using the following de-
pendent variables: Log of floors space (left, green squares and dashed fitted line), log of number of bed-
rooms (left red triangles and dotted fitted line), log of age of structure (left blue circles and solid fitted 
line), having a garage (right green squares and dashed fitted line), having central heating (right red trian-
gles and dotted fitted line) and property being held in leasehold (right blue circles and solid fitted line).  
Otherwise the graphs are comparable to the upper left panel in Figure 6. The size of the markers is pr o-
portionate to the number of responses in a conservation area. 
In the second set of robustness tests reported in Table A5 we experiment with including and 
excluding various sets of control variables in the first stage (estimation of price premia and ad-
justment of design indices) and the second stage (estimating the design effect). We find that 
omitting property and locational characteristics from the first-stage property price RDD models 
leads to larger coefficients, which is in line with a correlation between the design quality and 
other features of a building. In contrast, the results tend to change marginally only if the relative 
design scores are not adjusted for interviewee characteristics in a design quality first-stage. As 
evident from Figure 8 there is a positive correlation between income and educational differ-
ences across boundaries and differences in design quality across boundaries. A one step-
increase on our (differenced) distinctiveness score is associated with a £6,260 higher (differ-
enced) disposable income and a 9.1 percentage point higher (differenced) share of academic 
degree holders. These results support the view that wealthy households sort into areas of par-
ticular architectural value due to design preferences that sharply increase in income 
(Brueckner, et al., 1999). Controlling for income, education and ethnicity in the first-stage price 
premium RDD, however, only moderately reduces the baseline distinctiveness effect by three 
percentage points or about one sixth. We obtain similar results when controlling for neighbor-
hood effects and allowing for heterogeneity in the design effect with respect to income and edu-
cation in the second stage (Table A6 in the appendix). 
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Fig. 8. Relative income and education vs. design quality 
  
Notes:  Green (red) squares (triangles) compare adjusted relative distinctiveness scores (adjusted relative attra c-
tiveness scores) to relative income differences (income within inside 250m buffer – income within out-
side 250m buffer) in the left panel. Green (red) squares (triangles) compare the relative design measures 
to relative degree shares (degree share within inside 250m buffer – degree share within outside 250m 
buffer area) in the right panel. The size of the markers is proportionate to the number of responses in a 
conservation area. Dashed (dotted) line is the weighted linear fit. 
In the third set of robustness tests reported in Table A7 we address a potential mechanical link 
between price premia and design indices due to sorting related preference shocks that could 
simultaneously impact on the dependent and the independent variable. Building on the evi-
dence provided in Figure 4 we use the conservation area designation date as an instrumental 
variable for our design indices. As a second instrumental variable we use the number of listed 
buildings normalized by the surface area of a conservation area. The distinctiveness effect re-
mains within close range of the OLS results, no matter whether we use price premia estimated 
according to the baseline (equation 4) or extended (equation 5) RDD model. The distinctiveness 
effect also remains statistically significant in the baseline model and when we control for effects 
on historic buildings. The effect becomes insignificant if we further control for effects on post-
designation buildings, possibly due to a relatively weak IV first stage (F-stat = 8.65). The attrac-
tiveness effect, once more, is less robust. The point estimates tend to increases, but the standard 
errors increase disproportionately, which is not surprising given the weak first stage (F-stat = 
2.6). 
In the fourth set of robustness tests reported in Table A8 we combine the Article 4 status con-
trol variable with LPA fixed effects in the second-stage model (equation 10) to provide a very 
strong control for regulatory heterogeneity. The results need to be interpreted with care given 
that the number of fixed effects with 21 is large compared to the number of available observa-
tions. We find design effects which are generally positive and sizable, although frequently not 
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statistically significant due to relatively large standard errors. Interestingly, we find positive and 
significant effects that are within the range of the baseline estimates not only for distinctiveness 
but also for attractiveness when using the premia obtained from the more demanding property 
price RDD model (equation 5).  
In the fifth set of robustness tests reported in Table A9 we address the concern that the view 
estimates reported in Table 5 could be driven by unobserved locational factors that are highly 
localized near to conservation areas and correlated with the (reported) design quality of con-
servation areas. We conduct a falsification exercise by estimating the property price premia 
associated with a location within 50 meters of a conservation area, but outside our defined view 
impact areas. We expect that if a highly localized unobserved effect existed that was unrelated 
to, but correlated with, our design measure, it would also show up in the resulting placebo price 
premia. Reassuringly, we consistently find small and insignificant effects when replicating Ta-
ble 5 using the placebo price premia as dependent variable. 
5 Conclusion 
We have presented a unique method to estimate the economic value of architectural design. Our 
method separates the design effect from correlated location effects by differentiating property 
prices and design character across spatial boundaries within neighborhoods and comparing the 
differences in property prices and design across neighborhoods. We implement this method 
using conservation area boundaries as a source of discrete variation in design character. We 
obtain our indices of capitalized value and design scores using a combination of econometric 
techniques and qualitative methods. The estimated design value is large. Our baseline estimate 
suggests a capitalization effect of about 25.4% of property value (£38.7k in 2003 prices) associ-
ated with a one-step increase on a five-step scale ranging from not at all distinctive to very dis-
tinctive. The effect seems to a large extent attributable to an architectural externality, which 
provides some rationale for planning policies that seek to preserve and enhance the architec-
tural quality of the built environment. More research, however, is needed to assess the effec-
tiveness of planning policies to achieve this goal as well as the associated costs.  
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Appendix 
1 Introduction 
This technical appendix provides complementary material not reported in the main paper for 
brevity. The material presented comprises maps that illustrate the spatial setting of our study 
(Section 2), complementary results that are not essential for the message of the main paper but 
may be of interest to some readers (Section 3), and various robustness checks that substantiate 
the interpretations and conclusions presented in the main paper (Section 4). The appendix is 
not designed to stand alone or replace the reading of the main paper.  
2 Data 
2.1 Conservation area locations 
Our sampling strategy was to include conservation areas with varying levels of deprivation as 
described by 2007 ward level deprivation indices and conservation areas located in both inner 
and outer London boroughs.  We selected 24 areas with relatively high levels of deprivation and 
24 with low levels and 27 conservation areas within inner London boroughs and 21 in located 
in outer London. Figure A1 maps the resulting sample of conservation areas included in our 
study. We note that Courtfield was initially sampled but eventually excluded from the analysis 
due to insufficient property transactions. 
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Fig A1. Conservation area locations 
Notes:  Dark shaded areas are the sampled conserveration areas. ESRI topographic map in the background. 
Borough boundaries based on a shapefile from Office for National Statistics. 
2.2 Definition of view impact areas 
We refer to the area outside a conservation area from which the buildings inside the conserva-
tion area are visible as the view impact area. To approximate the view impact area of a conser-
vation area we begin by drawing an outside 25m buffer area around the conservation area, 
which is about the width of half a street plus one house in a typical neighborhood. As illustrated 
in Figure A2a this buffer area provides a reasonable approximation of the view impact area in 
many circumstances where there is a view across the street. In some cases, however, wider 
views are facilitated by open spaces such as parks or playing fields. In such instances we manu-
ally adjust the shape of the view impact area using the 25m buffer area as a starting point. For 
ease of adjustment, we slightly simplify the geometry of the 25m buffer (reduce the number of 
edges) before we adjust the boundaries. Figure A2b illustrates an example where a manual ad-
justment was made to provide a better approximation of the view impact area.  
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Fig A2a. View impact area 
Notes: Cross-hatched area is the conserveration area. Hatched area is the 25m buffer. Thick solid line show the 
view impact area. ESRI topographic map in the background. 
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Fig A2b. View impact area 
Notes: Cross-hatched area is the conserveration area. Hatched area is the 25m buffer. Thick solid line show the 
view impact area. ESRI topographic map in the background. 
2.3 Conservation areas and census unit boundaries 
To assess whether building design quality attracts certain types of households more than others 
and to control to some extent of the effects associated with such sorting we match neighbour-
hood characteristics to our data. Such data refer to spatial statistical units whose boundaries are 
typically not congruent with conservation area boundaries. We use disposable household in-
come estimates by Experian available at the level of lower level super output areas as well as 
the share of population holding an academic degree and various measures of ethnic composi-
tion available at output area level. For an exemplary conservation area we overlay the different 
boundaries in Figure A3. As expected, the conservation area boundaries differ significantly from 
those of the (super) output areas. However, it is also evident that (super) output areas are suffi-
ciently small to ensure that for each conservation area there are at least a couple of (super) out-
put areas with the majority of their surface area within the conservation area. It is therefore 
expected that a comparison of the aggregate of (super) output areas within and outside the 
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boundary of a conservation area will be informative with respect to the actual differences 
across the boundary. In merging the neighbourhood data to our data base we proceed as fol-
lows. To control for neighbourhood composition in the first-stage property price RDD we merge 
the neighbourhood variables to transactions based on the (super) output areas a transaction 
falls in. To aggregate neighbourhood statistics inside and outside the conservation area bounda-
ry we make use of the allocation of transactions to (super) output areas as an intermediate in-
put. Essentially, we compute the means over transactions inside and outside the conservation 
area and within the 250m buffers. This approach is asymptotically equivalent to a spatial inter-
polation weighted by population as long as turnover proportionate to population.  
Fig A3. Conservation areas and census unit boundaries 
Notes:  Black thick line is the conserveration area boundary. Thin solid red lines are boundaries of lower level 
super output areas. Thin dotted green lines are boundaries of output areas. 
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3 Complementary evidence 
3.1 Conservation area details 
In the main paper we have provided a range of descriptive and econometric comparisons be-
tween our estimated property price premia and the adjusted relative design indices. In Table A1 
we tabulate the estimated boundary premia along with the design indices and some additional 
information by conservation area.  
Tab A1. Conservation area details 
Conservation area Trans. RDD premium (baseline) Survey Architectural Planned 
N Name In Out Rel. t-stat Abs. £ N Attr. Dist. Style / period Estate 
1 Aldersbrook 66 59 0.20 2.15 29406 10 1.21 0.80 Edwardian Yes 
2 Barnsbury 172 72 0.27 2.68 45774 10 1.09 1.26 Georgian, Victorian No 
3 Bowes Park 50 161 -0.01 -0.23 -1180 15 0.06 0.41 Victorian No 
4 Brentham Garden Estate 41 35 0.26 2.90 68979 14 1.10 1.48 Edwardian Yes 
5 Brockley 181 287 0.08 1.75 10691 15 1.18 0.69 Victorian Yes 
6 Camberwell Grove 69 117 0.19 1.85 31045 10 0.88 1.29 Victorian, Edwardian Yes 
7 Canonbury 72 91 0.17 1.61 35655 10 1.33 1.35 Victorian Yes 
8 Clapton Square 68 73 0.10 0.82 13059 10 0.67 0.89 Victorian No 
9 Clyde Circus 33 135 0.05 0.80 5718 10 0.24 0.41 Victorian No 
10 Crabtree 130 68 -0.19 -2.89 -46117 20 0.60 0.33 Victorian, Edwardian Yes 
11 Crouch End 232 169 0.10 2.33 18723 10 1.23 1.24 Victorian No 
12 Cuckoo Estate 90 105 -0.04 -0.86 -6099 1 0.99 0.01 Interwar Yes 
13 De Beauvoir 91 13 0.11 0.70 19376 14 0.91 1.34 Victorian Yes 
14 Dulwich Village 42 210 0.37 5.75 84133 10 1.45 1.25 Victorian, Edwardian Yes 
15 East Canonbury 96 25 0.08 0.81 15649 10 0.83 0.92 Victorian Yes 
16 East India Estate 122 158 0.08 1.87 9161 11 0.79 0.56 Victorian, Edwardian No 
17 Fairfield Road 83 27 0.34 3.57 46561 10 1.02 1.02 Victorian, Edwardian No 
18 Graham Road and Mapledene 164 25 0.13 2.08 19502 10 0.81 0.89 Victorian Yes 
19 Hanger Hill Garden Estate 25 20 -0.26 -1.37 -50110 14 1.22 1.09 Interwar Yes 
20 Hatcham 38 87 0.03 0.33 2724 15 0.85 0.77 Victorian Yes 
21 Heaver Estate 142 183 0.06 1.39 11459 5 1.09 0.88 Victorian Yes 
22 Hillmarton 80 109 0.23 5.48 31705 10 0.93 0.51 Victorian Yes 
23 Holly Grove 52 98 0.00 -0.05 -580 10 1.08 1.12 Georgian, Victorian No 
24 Ladbroke 60 6 0.47 1.19 71244 16 0.84 1.25 Regency Yes 
25 Mayfield 31 109 0.25 4.02 33129 10 1.42 0.49 Interwar Yes 
26 Minet Estate 39 28 0.51 2.91 87367 10 1.32 0.96 Victorian Yes 
27 Muswell Hill 254 108 0.12 1.95 23642 20 0.77 0.85 Victorian Yes 
28 Noel Park 80 94 0.10 1.77 12293 10 0.79 0.44 Victorian No 
29 North Kilburn 40 60 0.10 1.04 20194 10 0.58 1.03 Victorian Yes 
30 Oak Hill 43 85 -0.08 -1.12 -11646 8 0.62 0.42 Regency, Victorian No 
31 Overcliffe, Gravesend 5 45 -0.36 -2.12 -30744 6 -0.54 -0.58 Victorian No 
32 Parsons Green 19 29 -0.16 -0.99 -45123 6 0.73 0.67 Victorian Yes 
33 Queens Park Estate 36 77 0.07 0.68 11948 10 1.39 1.43 Victorian No 
34 Ravenscourt and Starch Green 60 209 0.09 1.45 20068 10 0.93 0.94 Victorian, Edwardian No 
Table continues on next page 
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Tab. A1 continued 
Conservation area # trans. RDD premium (baseline) Survey Architectural Planned 
N Name In Out Rel. t-stat Abs. £ N Attr. Dist. Style / period Estate 
35 Sheen Road, Richmond 38 25 0.04 0.24 8213 9 0.33 0.93 Victorian No 
36 Southborough 27 134 -0.04 -0.64 -7840 15 1.27 0.62 Victorian No 
37 St John's Grove 36 118 0.24 2.51 37896 10 1.08 1.04 Victorian No 
38 St John's Wood 74 81 0.17 1.66 34760 10 1.59 1.14 Victorian, Edw., Interwar Yes 
39 St Mark's 57 71 0.05 0.32 8038 13 0.45 1.02 Victorian Yes 
40 St Matthias, Richmond 97 13 -0.30 -4.05 -84775 16 0.20 0.80 Victorian No 
41 Swiss Cottage 146 87 -0.03 -0.47 -5556 10 0.81 0.86 Victorian No 
42 Telegraph Hill 139 121 0.00 0.01 101 15 1.49 1.08 Victorian Yes 
43 Tower Gardens 34 30 0.00 0.00 -57 10 0.38 0.47 Edwardian Yes 
44 Turnham Green 46 40 -0.18 -1.22 -36486 13 1.09 0.82 Victorian No 
45 Wellesley Road, Chiswick 72 68 0.22 2.90 42262 10 0.88 0.67 Victorian Yes 
46 West Putney 64 107 0.14 2.63 23742 5 0.69 0.81 Victorian, Edwardian No 
47 Woodgrange Estate 31 60 0.30 3.51 27559 11 0.96 0.76 Victorian Yes 
Notes: # trans. gives the number of transactions within an Inside and Outside 250m buffer area from a conservation area. Rel. is the relative price premium at the boundary in log 
points. Likewise, Abs. is the respective premium in £. Attr. indicates relative attractiveness. Dist. similarly stands for distinctiveness. 
4.1 Hedonic estimates 
In computing the price premia at the conservation area boundaries according to equations 4-6 (in the 
main paper) we control for a broad range of property and locational characteristics. We report the esti-
mated implicit hedonic prices estimated in different variations of the price premium RDD models in 
Table A2. Columns (1-3) are variants of equation (4), where (2) is the baseline model (equation 4), (1) 
omits distance to conservation area boundary trends and (3) adds neighbourhood controls (income, 
degree share and ethnical mix). Columns (4-8) are variants of equation (5), where (7) is the model re-
ported in equation (5), columns (4-6) omit distance trends and/or controls for boundary effect on post-
designation buildings, and (8) adds neighbourhood controls. Columns (9-11) are variants of equation 
(6) used to estimate the premia associated with locations in view impact areas outside conservation 
areas, where (10) is the standard models, (9) omits distance trends and (11) adds neighbourhood con-
trols. 
The results are generally very consistent across specifications and in line with economic intuition. Larg-
er properties in terms of floor space, number of bedrooms and bathrooms are more expensive as are 
detached, semi-detached and terraced houses (as opposed to flats). New properties sell at a premium, 
but among other properties older properties achieve a premium in some, but not all specification, pos-
sibly reflecting a premium for historical style and character. Leasehold (as opposed to freehold) is asso-
ciated with a significant discount as expected. The only surprising parameter estimate among the struc-
tural characteristics is the negative coefficient of a garage, which indicates that properties with a garage 
are likely to have some unobserved negative features (e.g. unfavourable architectural style). Although 
we identify from variation within very small neighbourhoods where many locational attributes should 
be similar there is sufficient within neighbourhood variation to identify some significant effects for a 
number of features in a range of models. As an example we find positive effects associated with being 
close to a lake, or being located in an area where average key-stage 2 test scores in local schools are 
high. The negative effect of proximity to a bus stop likely reflects negative effects associated with a loca-
tion at a major road (e.g. noise, pollution) where busses typically pass through.  
The effects of the neighbourhood variables also come with little surprise. Where incomes and education 
levels tend to be higher property prices also tend to be higher. The ethnic variables are more difficult to 
interpret due to collinearity. They are primarily included to absorb as many correlated characteristics 
as possible. Conditional on differences in education and income levels we find that diversity is associat-
ed with a premium. 
Tab. A2. Hedonic implicit prices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Log sales price 
Building age (years) 0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Floor size (m²) 0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
New property (dummy) 0.117** 
(0.053) 
0.130** 
(0.052) 
0.134*** 
(0.051) 
0.138*** 
(0.045) 
0.148*** 
(0.044) 
0.064 
(0.048) 
0.070 
(0.046) 
0.071 
(0.047) 
0.139*** 
(0.047) 
0.147*** 
(0.047) 
0.145*** 
(0.045) 
Leasehold (dummy) -0.086*** 
(0.015) 
-0.084*** 
(0.015) 
-0.084*** 
(0.015) 
-0.078*** 
(0.014) 
-0.075*** 
(0.014) 
-0.079*** 
(0.014) 
-0.077*** 
(0.014) 
-0.075*** 
(0.015) 
-0.119*** 
(0.023) 
-0.119*** 
(0.023) 
-0.122*** 
(0.023) 
Garage (dummy) -0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
Central heating (dummy) -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
No. of bathrooms 0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.024* 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
No. of bedrooms 0.081*** 
(0.006) 
0.081*** 
(0.006) 
0.085*** 
(0.006) 
0.084*** 
(0.006) 
0.084*** 
(0.006) 
0.085*** 
(0.006) 
0.086*** 
(0.006) 
0.089*** 
(0.006) 
0.087*** 
(0.009) 
0.088*** 
(0.008) 
0.091*** 
(0.008) 
Detached house (dummy) 0.123*** 
(0.027) 
0.117*** 
(0.027) 
0.118*** 
(0.026) 
0.128*** 
(0.027) 
0.119*** 
(0.027) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.113*** 
(0.027) 
0.115*** 
(0.026) 
0.110** 
(0.046) 
0.108** 
(0.045) 
0.107** 
(0.044) 
Semi-detached house (dum-
my) 
0.064*** 
(0.016) 
0.068*** 
(0.016) 
0.071*** 
(0.016) 
0.070*** 
(0.015) 
0.074*** 
(0.015) 
0.069*** 
(0.015) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
0.076*** 
(0.015) 
0.045** 
(0.022) 
0.049** 
(0.023) 
0.053** 
(0.022) 
Terraced house (dummy) 0.058*** 
(0.016) 
0.060*** 
(0.016) 
0.063*** 
(0.016) 
0.070*** 
(0.015) 
0.073*** 
(0.015) 
0.067*** 
(0.015) 
0.070*** 
(0.015) 
0.073*** 
(0.015) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.040* 
(0.024) 
Distance to nearest National 
Park 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.019 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
Distance to nearest Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty 
-0.041*** 
(0.016) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.058*** 
(0.016) 
-0.052*** 
(0.016) 
-0.063*** 
(0.016) 
-0.058*** 
(0.016) 
-0.037** 
(0.015) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.040* 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
Distance to nearest Natural 
Nature Reserve 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
Distance to nearest lake -0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.034** 
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.016) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.016) 
-0.037** 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.056*** 
(0.020) 
-0.060*** 
(0.022) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
Distance to nearest river 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
Distance to nearest coastline -0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.045*** 
(0.017) 
Distance to nearest bus stop 0.228*** 
(0.041) 
0.220*** 
(0.043) 
0.164*** 
(0.043) 
0.253*** 
(0.041) 
0.247*** 
(0.042) 
0.262*** 
(0.040) 
0.251*** 
(0.041) 
0.199*** 
(0.041) 
0.169*** 
(0.055) 
0.143** 
(0.057) 
0.071 
(0.056) 
Distance to nearest railway 
tracks 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
-0.034 
(0.023) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
Table continues on next page 
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Dist. to nearest underground 
stations 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
0.020 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
IDW of Key stage 2 score per 
MSOA 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.045** 
(0.023) 
0.046** 
(0.023) 
0.042** 
(0.021) 
0.042* 
(0.022) 
0.035 
(0.022) 
0.035 
(0.023) 
0.039* 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.036) 
0.047 
(0.038) 
0.043 
(0.036) 
Degree share (%) 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Median Income (in 1000 £) 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Share of White at total popu-
lation 
0.066 
(0.168) 
0.108 
(0.159) 
0.019 
(0.228) 
Share of Mixed at total popu-
lation 
0.179 
(0.227) 
0.283 
(0.219) 
-0.344 
(0.317) 
Share of Asian at total popu-
lation 
0.111 
(0.178) 
0.085 
(0.165) 
0.142 
(0.237) 
Share of Black at total popula-
tion 
-0.080 
(0.170) 
-0.058 
(0.154) 
-0.009 
(0.236) 
Constant 0.203*** 
(0.071) 
0.194*** 
(0.069) 
0.172* 
(0.092) 
CA x neighborhood Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - 
CA distance x neighborhood - Yes Yes - Yes - Yes Yes - - - 
Historic x neighborhood - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Hist. x CA x neighborhood - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Post-designation x neighb. - - - - - Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Post-designation x CA neighb. - - - - - Yes Yes Yes - - - 
View x neighborhood - - - - - - - - Yes Yes Yes 
View distance x neighb. - - - - - - - - - Yes Yes 
Year x neighborhood Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 4,137 4,137 4,137 
r2 0.920 0.922 0.925 0.925 0.927 0.927 0.929 0.931 0.923 0.926 0.932 
Notes.  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on year x conservation area cells. CA neighborhood indicates conservation area specific indicator variables. CA distance x 
neighborhood indicates conservation area specific distance to conservation area boundary trends (0 at boundary).  Historic x neighborhood indicates indicator variables 
denoting historic buildings (before WWII) in a given neighborhood. Post-designation x neighb. Similarly indicates indicator variables denoting properties constructed 
after designation in a neighborhood in a given neighborhood. View x neighborhood indicates indicator variables denoting properties outside a conservation area with a 
view onto buildings in a conservation area within a given neighborhood. View distance x neighb. indicates conservation area specific distance to view impact area 
boundary trends (0 at boundary). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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4.2 Attractiveness and distinctiveness 
In Section 4.4 in the main paper we discuss how spatial differences across conservation area 
boundaries in distinctiveness and attractiveness are associated with differences in property prices. 
Because of the relatively low number of observations and the relatively high collinearity of the two 
design indices (correlation coefficient close to 0.6) we prefer to estimate attractiveness and distinc-
tiveness in separate models. Moreover, the distinctiveness and attractiveness effects, because they 
capture different shades of a similar phenomenon, are difficult to interpret conditional on each oth-
er. In Table A3 we nevertheless include both variables simultaneously in models that are otherwise 
identical to Tables 2 and 3 in the main paper. As mentioned in the main paper the distinctiveness 
effects tends to remain somewhat closer to the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 in the main paper. 
The effect of a one-step increase in distinctiveness and attractiveness in Table A3 is within the 
range of a one-step in increase in distinctiveness or attractiveness in Tables 2 and 3 in the main 
paper suggesting that in each case we capture the effects of the same phenomenon. 
Tab. A3 Attractiveness & distinctiveness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price premium in conservation area relative to surrounding areas 
log points log points £ log points log points log points 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.183* 
(0.096) 
0.144** 
(0.064) 
24969.48** 
(11427.5) 
0.164* 
(0.084) 
0.101 
(0.082) 
0.124 
(0.089) 
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.057 
(0.087) 
0.131* 
(0.077) 
21822.7 
(15171.5) 
0.111 
(0.088) 
0.168** 
(0.072) 
0.167* 
(0.085) 
Constant -0.101** 
(0.044) 
-0.150*** 
(0.053) 
-26741.6** 
(13616.6) 
-0.158** 
(0.059) 
-0.169*** 
(0.060) 
-0.186*** 
(0.068) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2nd stage controls - - - - Yes Yes 
WLS - - - Yes - Yes 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 
r2 0.275 0.294 0.248 0.236 0.423 0.414 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that price 
premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1 st-stage distance trends indi-
cates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area boundary trends. 2 nd stage 
controls consist of the following variables: Dummy variables for the architectural styles Georgian, Regency, 
Edwardian, Interwar (baseline architectural style category is Victorian), dummy variable for planned estate, 
dummy variable for Article 4. WLS estimates are weighted by the number of survey responses in an area. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5 Robustness 
5.1 Alternative outcome measures 
A popular means to validate boundary discontinuity estimates is to demonstrate that an estimated 
discontinuity exists in the outcome measure of interest only, and not in other observables which 
potentially determine the outcome, but are not related to the phenomenon of interest. In our con-
text we are not primarily interested in whether or not there exists a discontinuity across conserva-
tion area boundaries, on average, but whether individual discontinuities are correlated with differ-
ences in design quality across these boundaries. In this double-differencing setting the analogical 
validation test, thus, is to rerun the first and second stages using alternative property features as 
economic outcome variables in the property first stage. Table A4 reports six variants of this ap-
proach. We find no significant correlation when considering the log of floor space, the log of the 
number of bedrooms, the log of age of the structure, whether a property has a garage or central 
heating or whether the property is held in leasehold as a response variable in our first-stage RDD 
models (according to equation 4). These complementary results make it arguably less likely that 
our estimated design capitalization effects are driven by unobserved internal property characteris-
tics that are correlated with design value. 
Table A4 Boundary effects in covariates vs. relative design quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Boundary 
discontinu-
ity in log of 
floor space 
Boundary 
discontinu-
ity in log of 
number of 
bed rooms 
Boundary 
discontinu-
ity in log of 
age of 
structure 
Boundary 
discontinu-
ity in prop-
erty having 
a garage 
Boundary 
discontinu-
ity in prop-
erty having 
central 
heating 
Boundary 
discontinu-
ity in prop-
erty being 
held in 
leasehold 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.029 
(0.369) 
-0.468 
(0.381) 
0.595 
(0.400) 
0.059 
(0.058) 
-0.022 
(0.066) 
-0.128 
(0.123) 
Constant 0.210 
(0.365) 
0.482 
(0.297) 
-0.277 
(0.358) 
-0.087 
(0.063) 
0.003 
(0.058) 
0.069 
(0.123) 
1st-stage survey controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
1st-stage distance trends YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 
r2 0.000 0.053 0.049 0.017 0.005 0.025 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. Dependent variables 1st-stage survey con-
trols indicates that design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1 st-stage distance trends indi-
cates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area or view impact area 
boundary trends. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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5.2 Controls 
In computing the price premia at the conservation area boundaries according to equations (4) and 
(5) (in the main paper) we control for a broad range of property and locational characteristics (see 
section 4.2 in this appendix for the hedonic implicit prices). Similarly, we adjust our design 
measures for observable interviewee characteristics (see Table 1 in the main text). In columns (1-
3) of Table A4 we experiment with omitting these controls in the first-stage regressions used to
compute the price premium and design measures. Column (1) reports a model where both first-
stages are estimated excluding any controls, i.e. we compare raw differences in prices and reported 
design quality across conservation areas. Compared to the baseline model the distinctiveness effect 
increases by about 25%. If we add interviewee characteristics to the design first stage (but no con-
trols to the property price premium RDD) the distinctiveness effect increases further by some addi-
tional 10% (column 2). Adding controls to the price premium RDD only (no adjustment of the re-
ported distinctiveness scores) yields results that are very close to the baseline model.  
In columns (4-5) we further expand the set of controls in the first-stage property price premium 
RDD to include variables that capture income, education and ethnicity of the local residents. Despite 
the evidence for residential sorting of high income and high education households into conserva-
tion areas with high relative design quality (see Figure 7 in the main paper) the distinctiveness ef-
fect remains remarkably robust. Compared to the baseline model (Table 2, column 2) the effect is 
reduced by about three percentage points (about one sixth) (column 4). In column (5) we add the 
neighbourhood controls to the first-stage price premium RDD of Table 3, column (2) model. The 
attractiveness effect is reduced by slightly more than 10%, but remains significant. Similarly, we 
add neighbourhood controls to the price premium first stage of Table 5, column (6) in column (6). 
The design effect remains virtually unchanged.  
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Tab. A4. Robustness I – First- and second-stage controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price premium relative to surrounding areas (log points) 
Conserva-
tion area 
Conserva-
tion area 
Conserva-
tion area 
Conserva-
tion area 
Conserva-
tion area 
View im-
pact area 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.307*** 
(0.060) 
0.341*** 
(0.073) 
0.228*** 
(0.046) 
0.187*** 
(0.051) 
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.182*** 
(0.065) 
Buildings are attractive to 
look at (-2 to 2) 
0.123*** 
(0.047) 
Constant -0.088* 
(0.053) 
-0.120** 
(0.059) 
-0.103** 
(0.041) 
-0.084* 
(0.049) 
-0.088 
(0.063) 
-0.105* 
(0.059) 
1st-stage survey controls - Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2nd-stage census controls - - - Yes Yes Yes 
N 47 47 47 47 47 46 
r2 0.274 0.317 0.257 0.199 0.212 0.061 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that price 
premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1 st-stage distance trends indi-
cates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area or view impact area 
boundary trends. 1nd-stage census controls indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on 2001 
census characteristics (including income, share of white population, share of black population, share of mixed 
non-white population, and a Herfendal index of ethnic mix. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
5.3 Sorting 
In Figure 7 in the main paper we correlate differences in education and income across the inside 
and outside 250m conservation area boundary buffers with our indices of relative design quality. 
The corresponding (unweighted) regressions are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table A5. Educa-
tional and income differences significantly increase with the relative design quality of an area. Since 
our differences in property prices across conservation areas also are significantly positively corre-
lated with our preferred relative design index (columns 3 and 4) the question arises to which extent 
correlation between property price premia and design quality is driven by sorting. In column (5) 
we expand the baseline second-stage model (equation 4) to control for income and educational 
differences across conservation area boundaries. Moreover we control for the income and educa-
tional levels within the inner 250m buffer; and interact these with our preferred relative design 
quality measure to allow for heterogeneity in design preferences with respect of income and educa-
tion. This is a relatively demanding model given the limited number of observations. Still, the design 
effect proves robust and is only moderately reduced compared to the baseline estimate. Similarly 
the expanded model (equation 5), which controls for internal design effects, remains robust (col-
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umn 6). Briefly summarized, we find evidence for design quality related sorting, but little evidence 
that the estimated premium is driven by this sorting. 
Tab A5. Robustness IV: Income effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Yearly 
disposa-
ble in-
come 
relative 
to sur-
rounding 
areas 
(1000 £) 
Degree 
share 
relative 
to sur-
rounding 
areas 
(%) 
Price 
premium 
relative 
to sur-
rounding 
areas 
(log 
points) 
Price 
premium 
relative 
to sur-
rounding 
areas 
(log 
points) 
Price 
premium 
relative 
to sur-
rounding 
areas 
(log 
points) 
Price 
premium 
relative 
to sur-
rounding 
areas 
(log 
points) 
Distinctiveness relative to sur-
rounding areas (-2 to 2) 
6.260** 
(2.484) 
9.073** 
(3.756) 
0.226*** 
(0.078) 
0.200** 
(0.101) 
Yearly disposable income relative 
to surrounding areas (1000 £) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.026) 
Degree share relative to sur-
rounding areas (%) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
Yearly disposable income inside 
conservation areas (1000 £) 
0.000 
(0.030) 
-0.092 
(0.079) 
Relative distinctiveness x income 
inside CA 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.058 
(0.058) 
Relative distinctiveness x degree 
share inside CA 
0.003 
(0.027) 
0.010 
(0.059) 
Degree share inside conservation 
areas (%) 
0.003 
(0.020) 
0.027 
(0.035) 
Constant -1.228 
(2.033) 
-3.157 
(3.229) 
0.061** 
(0.026) 
0.073** 
(0.029) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
-0.142 
(0.093) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st. stage historic effects - - - - - Yes 
1st. stage post-des. effects - - - - - Yes 
N 47 47 47 47 47 43 
r2 0.176 0.181 0.096 0.067 0.332 0.327 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1 st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that price 
premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1st-stage distance trends indi-
cates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area boundary trends. 1st. stage 
historic effects (1st. stage post-des. effects ) indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on bounda-
ry effects on historic (post-designation) properties. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
In Table A6 we address the concern that there may be a mechanical endogeneity problem in the 
relationship between our price premium and design quality measures because preference-based 
sorting could have effects similar to neighborhood shocks that impact on both the dependent and 
the independent variables at the same time. To avoid this mechanical endogeneity problem we use 
two instrumental variables for the design measures in the second stage (equation 10): The date of 
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conservation area designation (assuming that high design quality areas are designated first) and 
the number of listed buildings normalized by the surface area of a conservation area. We apply a 
2SLS estimation to our baseline second-stage model (columns 2 and 5), the baseline model exclud-
ing first-stage distance trends (columns 1 and 4) and the expanded model controlling for internal 
design effects (columns 3 and 6). We obtain  first-stages in the 2SLS for our distinctiveness measure 
of borderline strength (F-stat = 8.65). The second-stage results are generally robust and within the 
range of the respective OLS results, although the most demanding model yields an insignificant de-
sign estimate (column 3). The attractiveness results are less compelling. The first stages are weak 
(F-stat <3) and the second-stage confidence intervals are correspondingly large. 
Tab. A6. Robustness III – IV models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price premium inside conservation area boundary relative to surrounding 
areas (log points) 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.246*** 
(0.090) 
0.162* 
(0.096) 
0.204 
(0.142) 
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.364 
(0.237) 
0.205 
(0.198) 
0.291 
(0.445) 
Constant -0.103 
(0.070) 
-0.049 
(0.082) 
-0.125 
(0.127) 
-0.219 
(0.197) 
-0.095 
(0.168) 
-0.211 
(0.422) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends - Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
1st. stage historic effects - - Yes - - Yes 
1st. stage post-des. effects - - Yes - - Yes 
N 47 47 44 47 47 44 
Notes:  Estimation method is 2SLS in all models. Instrumental variables for the design measures are the conservation 
area designation date and the number of listed buildings normalized by the surface area of conservation area. 
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that de-
sign measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that price pre-
mium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1 st-stage distance trends indicates 
that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conservation area boundary trends. 1st. stage his-
toric effects (1st. stage post-des. effects ) indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on boundary 
effects on historic (post-designation) properties. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
5.4 Regulatory heterogeneity 
We have, thus far, argued that there is little reason to expect that there is systematic variation in the 
relative regulatory restrictiveness in conservation areas taking aside the Article 4 status, which we 
have controlled for in the baseline models. This is because more restrictive LPAs are likely more 
restrictive inside conservation areas as well as outside conservation areas, thus, the differences 
cancel out. In Table A6 we allow for arbitrary differences in the regulatory environment across 
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LPAs by means of LPA fixed effects that we add to a number of second-stage models (equation 10). 
We generally find positive and sizable design effects. The coefficient estimates are, however, some-
what unstable and frequently insignificant due to large standard errors. This is not surprising in 
light of the limited degrees of freedom given 21 fixed effects in a model with only 46-47 observa-
tions. Notably, the effects are positive, significant, and within the range of the baseline estimates in 
the more demanding models that control for the internal design effect.  
Tab. A6. Robustness IV –LPAs fixed effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price premium inside conservation area boundary relative to surround-
ing areas (log points) 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.096* 
(0.052) 
0.224* 
(0.123) 
0.302** 
(0.146) 
Attractiveness relative to sur-
rounding areas (-2 to 2) 
0.098 
(0.114) 
0.162 
(0.141) 
0.270** 
(0.116) 
Article 4 0.010 
(0.077) 
0.003 
(0.072) 
-0.164 
(0.138) 
-0.194 
(0.125) 
-0.158 
(0.164) 
-0.184 
(0.163) 
Constant -0.004 
(0.086) 
0.005 
(0.054) 
-0.043 
(0.118) 
-0.076 
(0.095) 
-0.134 
(0.110) 
-0.139 
(0.125) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st. stage historic effects - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st. stage post-des. effects - - - - Yes Yes 
2nd stage LPA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 47 47 47 47 46 46 
r2 0.720 0.723 0.574 0.604 0.621 0.650 
Notes:  Estimation method is 2SLS in all models. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 
1st-stage survey controls indicates that design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage 
property controls indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on structural and location character-
istics. 1st-stage distance trends indicates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to conserva-
tion area boundary trends. 1st. stage historic effects (1st. stage post-des. effects ) indicates that price premium 
is estimated conditional on boundary effects on historic (post-designation) properties. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
5.5 Placebo view impact area 
Since the view impact areas used in the models reported in the main paper are possibly measured 
with error and because the good views could at least theoretically be correlated with very local 
unobserved amenities we make use of placebo view areas in a falsification exercise. We define as a 
placebo view area the area just outside the actual view impact area, but within 50m of a conserva-
tion area. We then compute property price premia according to equation (6) using the placebo view 
impact areas instead of the actual view impact areas. Finally, we replicate Table 5 from the main 
paper using placebo view impact property price premia as dependent variable in Table A8. Reas-
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suringly, we find not positive and significant effect in the placebo estimates. For one of the design 
measures (column 3 and 6) we even found negative and statistically significant effects. The results 
do not support the presences of an unobserved local amenity that is correlated with the conserva-
tion areas’ design value, thus, we consider this falsification exercise successful. 
Tab. A8. Robustness V – Placebo outside view effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Price premium in placebo view impact area relative to surrounding areas 
(log points) 
Distinctiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
-0.050 
(0.047) 
 
 
 
 
-0.059 
(0.058) 
 
 
 
 
Attractiveness relative to 
surrounding areas (-2 to 2) 
 
 
-0.036 
(0.039) 
 
 
 
 
-0.030 
(0.037) 
 
 
Buildings are attractive to 
look at (-2 to +2) 
 
 
 
 
-0.060* 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
 
-0.061* 
(0.034) 
Constant 0.014 
(0.041) 
0.006 
(0.040) 
0.039 
(0.039) 
0.030 
(0.040) 
0.009 
(0.033) 
0.048 
(0.032) 
1st-stage survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage property controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st-stage distance trends    Yes Yes Yes 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 
r2 0.026 0.015 0.058 0.030 0.009 0.050 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped in 100 iterations. 1st-stage survey controls indicates that 
design measure is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 1st-stage property controls indicates that price 
premium is estimated conditional on structural and location characteristics. 1st-stage distance trends indi-
cates that price premium is estimated conditional on distance to placebo view impact area boundary trends. * 
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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